Perverse incentives? Labor market regulation and performance in the public sector

Alberto Chong, Angelo Cozzubo

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículo de revista revisión exhaustiva

Resumen

We test the link between labor market regulations and job performance in the public sector using a novel outcome variable, namely, the number of days it takes the postal service to return letters sent to nonexistent foreign addresses, a measure that we argue is an excellent proxy for job performance. We find a positive and statistically significant link between these two variables, regardless of the labor regulation measure employed, changes in specification, and even unlikely endogeneity considerations, which suggest that this finding may be causal.

Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)271-285
Número de páginas15
PublicaciónSouthern Economic Journal
Volumen86
N.º1
DOI
EstadoPublicada - jul. 2019

Nota bibliográfica

Funding Information:
We are grateful to Arlette Beltr?n, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Joan Mart?nez, Andrei Shleifer, Luisa Zanforlin, and seminar participants at the University of Ottawa and the World Bank for comments and suggestions. The standard disclaimer applies.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 by the Southern Economic Association

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