Perverse incentives? Labor market regulation and performance in the public sector

Alberto Chong, Angelo Cozzubo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle in a journalpeer-review

Abstract

We test the link between labor market regulations and job performance in the public sector using a novel outcome variable, namely, the number of days it takes the postal service to return letters sent to nonexistent foreign addresses, a measure that we argue is an excellent proxy for job performance. We find a positive and statistically significant link between these two variables, regardless of the labor regulation measure employed, changes in specification, and even unlikely endogeneity considerations, which suggest that this finding may be causal.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)271-285
Number of pages15
JournalSouthern Economic Journal
Volume86
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 by the Southern Economic Association

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