(Incorrect) Perceived Returns and Strategic Behavior among Talented Low-Income College Graduates

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Resumen

Job applicants use resumes to send signals to potential employers. Applicants are free to select the items that go in their resumes and are expected to include signals they perceive will help them achieve their goals and avoid those that they anticipate could hurt them. We show that 92 percent of beneficiaries of a highly selective scholarship for poor and talented students avoid listing this award when applying for jobs. This is consistent with beneficiaries perceiving a negative labor market return from sending that signal. A correspondence study shows instead that listing the scholarship increases callback rates by 20 percent.
Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)423-426
PublicaciónAEA Papers & Proceedings
Volumen113
EstadoPublicada - may. 2023

Palabras clave

  • Perceived returns
  • Strategic behavior
  • Job seeking

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