Abstract
We deal with the generalized Nash game proposed by Rosen, which is a game
with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A
reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen’s result can be deduced from the one given by Arrow and Debreu. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a point to be a generalized Nash equilibrium employing the variational inequality approach. Finally, some existence results are given in the non-compact case under coerciveness conditions.
with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A
reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen’s result can be deduced from the one given by Arrow and Debreu. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a point to be a generalized Nash equilibrium employing the variational inequality approach. Finally, some existence results are given in the non-compact case under coerciveness conditions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Cornell University |
| Pages | 1-20 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 10 Jul 2023 |