Cartel fácil: Estudio comparado sobre los facilitadores de colusión en el Derecho de la Competencia en América del Sur

Andrés Francisco Calderón López

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle in a journalpeer-review


With the purpose to avoid identification and punishment for their anticompetitive practices, cartelists often recruit third parties’ help to organize, execute and conceal the cartel. These third parties may be consulting firms, guilds, or professional advisors, which do not conduct their businesses in the market where the collusion takes place. In this paper, the author presents a comparative study of how national competition authorities and legislators in South America have dealt with the emergence of cartels’ facilitators. Finally, the author poses the alternative of applying Competition Law to public officials who provide assistance to anticompetitive practices.
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)31-63
JournalRevista de derecho de la competencia CEDEC
Issue numberExtra 1
StatePublished - 2019

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