Resumen
We deal with the generalized Nash game proposed by Rosen, which is a game
with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A
reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen’s result can be deduced from the one given by Arrow and Debreu. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a point to be a generalized Nash equilibrium employing the variational inequality approach. Finally, some existence results are given in the non-compact case under coerciveness conditions.
with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A
reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen’s result can be deduced from the one given by Arrow and Debreu. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a point to be a generalized Nash equilibrium employing the variational inequality approach. Finally, some existence results are given in the non-compact case under coerciveness conditions.
| Idioma original | Inglés |
|---|---|
| Editorial | Cornell University |
| Páginas | 1-20 |
| DOI | |
| Estado | Publicada - 10 jul. 2023 |
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