Even though many countries in Latin America have adopted FOI Laws, there are significant differences in the institutional design of FOI oversight institutions. Most explanations highlight the role of political competition in motivating political actors to design strong de jure FOI oversight institutions. The design of FOI oversight institutions in Chile, Peru and Uruguay, however, cannot fully be explained by political competition. We show how isomorphic pressures help explain variation in the de jure strength of the FOI oversight institutions. Our findings highlight the importance of considering domestic constraints on the diffusion of one-size-fits-all models. To analyze each case, we conducted a systematic process-tracing analysis. Our in-depth analysis allowed us to assess different theories concerning the specific institutional design of FOI oversight institutions.
Nota bibliográficaFunding Information:
The authors would like to thank Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación—Fondo Clemente Estable, “Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública en Chile, Perú y Uruguay” (FCE_1_2017_1_136604) for its support. Fernando Rosenblatt would like to thank ANID—Millennium Science Initiative Program (Code ICN17_002). Paula Muñoz would like to thank the Internationalization of Research Fund granted by the Vice presidency for Academic Affairs, Universidad del Pacífico. The authors wish to thank Wendy Adrianzen, Camilo García Cisterna, Martina Giménez, Lihuen Nocetto, Gianfranco Silva, and Victoria Vega for their assistance in different stages of our study. The authors wish to thank Cynthia McClintock, Gregory Michener, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.
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