Reformulations for projected solutions of generalized games

Carlos Calderón, Marco Castellani, John Edwin Cotrina Asto, Massimiliano Giuli

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle in a journalpeer-review

Abstract

We show that projected solutions of a generalized game correspond to classical ones of an auxiliary generalized game obtained by doubling the number of players. Based on this reformulation and using known results for the existence of classical solutions, we deduce some new existence results for projected solutions of generalized Nash equilibrium problems and quasivariational inequalities.
Original languageEnglish
Article number4
JournalJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Volume204
Issue number1
Early online date25 Dec 2024
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2025

Bibliographical note

Published: 25 December 2024.

Volume 204, article number 4, (2025).

Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2024.

Keywords

  • Projected solution
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Variational inequality
  • Abstract economy

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