Port infrastructure: An access model for the essential facility

This paper analyzes the main consequences for the Peruvian port sector of an access regime that applies to monopolistic infrastructures considered ‘essential facilities’. It is based in the ‘Coase theorem’ and the ‘Demsetz approach’ and its goal is to make competition viable in markets for services that otherwise would be monopolized by incumbents. Taking into account information asymmetries between the regulator and regulated firms, access procedures minimize regulatory risk by allowing the former to intervene only when a negotiated agreement is not possible. The regime also facilitates entry and competition by providing incumbents and access seekers with incentives to negotiate access conditions. The threat of a mandate that may punish any party provides incentives for them to reach a Nash Equilibrium. A mechanism for ‘for the market’ competition it is also devised for situations where this is desirable. In the port sector, the regime’s first consequences suggest an improvement in the competitive and institutional environment of port markets. It also seems to be generating productive and allocative efficiencies, thus contributing to a reduction of Peru’s maritime transport costs.