Cualificación ontológica y unidad de las maneras del ser

This paper addresses two questions raised by Heidegger in The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology. The first concerns the instance from which the ways of Being (existence, ready-to-hand, etc.) would be qualified as belonging to Being. The second concerns the apprehen-sion of the unity of Being given that it is characterised by a variety of ways. Heidegger leaves both questions unanswered; our research deals hermeneutically-phenomenologically with this challenge in two steps. First, the ontological qualification of the ways of Being as ways of Being is not achieved by subsuming them under a simple concept of Being, but by their de-termination as meaning and ground of beings; in this we show that they partially identify with Being itself. Second, the variety of the ways of Being finds its unity in the pre-ontological understanding of concrete Dasein, in which takes place the simultaneous openness of the existential way of Being and the categorical ways of Being.