Concurso sin competencia: Las reglas de los procedimientos de selección que favorecen las licitaciones colusorias

Translated title of the contribution: A contest without competition: Analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle in a journalpeer-review

Abstract

Responsibility for bid rigging lies not only with cartel members or a corrupt public official. Legislators are also responsible. This paper critically analyzes some legal rules for public tenders that may facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as publication of public entities’ reserve price, the disclosure of the identity of contestants, contact between bidders and allowing consortiums without restrictions. Resting on comparative experience from OECD, Spain, Chile, Colombia, among others, the author proposes some reforms to favor competition in public procurement
Translated title of the contributionA contest without competition: Analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)66-90
JournalRevista de Derecho Administrativo
Issue number18
StatePublished - 2020

Bibliographical note

El siguiente artículo fue recibido por la Comisión de Publicaciones el 22 de noviembre de 2019 y aprobado para su publicación el 22 de junio de 2020.

Bibliografía: páginas 89-90.

Keywords

  • Cartel
  • Competition
  • Contest
  • Public procurement
  • Bid rigging
  • Publicity
  • Transparency

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